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Introduction
A common trope in much of the writing on sub-national economic development policy in the UK is that it is characterised by “experimentation” (Deas et al., 2000; Ward and Deas, 2000; Wilks-Heeg, 1996).  In this sphere, perhaps more so than many others, policy makers are said to have toyed with the aims, objectives, methods and, particularly, the spatial scale at which policy is designed and delivered.  However, at the same time it is widely acknowledged that upon close inspection the degree to which the latest policy experiment genuinely represents new thinking is often overstated and dependent upon a very myopic view of history (Deas, 2012; Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2013).  This idea that ‘continuity rather than contrast’ is the best way of understanding what superficially appears to be a purportedly innovative policy field is reinforced by considering the territorial preferences of policy makers.  It is from this perspective that we can place the new regionalism of the 1990s and early 2000s (HM Treasury, 2001) as strongly redolent of policy and practice dating to the 1920s  (Wannop and Cherry, 1994); experimentation with a new “city-regionalism” in the early 2000s to echo earlier trials with metropolitan country councils (cf. SURF, 2003; Leach and Game, 1991; see also, conceptually, Geddes, 1915), and the new localism, the vogue expression at the time of writing, to be actually (at least) the second or third time this scale has been discovered by government (DoE, 1977; Imrie and Raco, 1999; Stoker, 2004; Pickles, 2010).  Academics have enjoyed pointing out how little of the novel is genuinely new (Cochrane, 1999; Ward and Jones 2002).
The question that remains is not why we feel the need to experiment in urban policy in the first place but rather, why we feel the need to re-experiment.  Remembering Einstein’s famous quip that insanity can be defined as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results” seems appropriate here: why would a new experiment with city-regionalism, for example, built on similar terms to previous attempts yield qualitatively different results?  
Amongst the possible explanations is an ideological faith in a change to the formula – using a similar palate of ingredients but emphasising more strongly one of the flavours.  For example formal, even contractual, cross sector partnership working versus the discursive desire to elevate one partner, such as the private sector, to a position of dominance might elucidate differences of impulse between, in the case of the latter, Conservative policy in the 1980s and, in the case of the former, that of New Labour post-1997 (cf. Russell, 2010 2008; Thornley, 1991).  The results are institutions, policies and prescriptions that bear the discursive imprint of a particular government’s preferences and contribute to the impression of a ‘style’ of urban economic development policy specific to a time and place.  
But changes in style are often superficial: what might be said to remain beneath the surface are deeper continuities manifest in many different ways.  For example, the ‘new’ urban experiment is frequently peopled by the same individuals employed in the last one. These “usual suspects” (Sherlock, Kirk and Reeves, 2004; see also, Harding, 1999) often have intimate knowledge of a particular urban context and the issues peculiar to it and, therefore, may retain an impulse to continue their work irrespective of what they (probably correctly) expect to be transitory, ephemeral changes ushered in by transitory, ephemeral government.
An alternative interpretation is that superficial experimentation is essential to masking the truth that sub-national policy mutates so frequently because it is charged with confronting intractable problems fundamentally born of wealth inequality.  Repeatedly tinkering with the terms of the game, the names of the agencies and the scale at which they deliver their work it is argued is consequently best understood as a device to cope with the localised, urban effects resulting from the internal contradictions at the heart of the national economic system.  This interpretation of urban regeneration policy as a core aspect of a state’s approach to “crisis management” has been the subject of sustained academic research (Jones and Ward, 2002; for some interesting case studies see England and Ward, 2007) and may well fundamentally explain the circumstances that result in the latest urban experiment jostling for room with the last.

Despite general support for this view, in this essay an alternative way of understanding the wax and wane of urban experiments is considered: the idea that in urban regeneration policy, just as in other walks of life, fashions repeat.  To explore this idea a brief outline of recent experimentation in urban regeneration policy is sketched within the context of the literature on how trends form, take root and pass.  Thereafter a specific focus is taken on the case history of one particular UK experiment: Urban Regeneration Companies.

A history of fads: British sub-national regeneration policy
Short-lived enthusiasms, or fads, have been the subject of academic work for many years.  Seminal moments in the literature on the sociology and psychology of fashion trends can be found in, chronologically, Simmel (1904); Sapir (1937), and; Meyersohn and Katz (1957).  Much of this work served to lay the foundations for subsequent modern studies of how crazes take root in fields as superficially diverse as youth culture (Savage, 1997; more generally see, Crane and Bovone, 2006; Davis, 1992; Entwistle, 2000, 2009) and, in the case of Sorokin’s (1956) Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology, even academia.
Elsewhere studies from business economics and management have speculated on models of how trends begin, take root and diffuse.  Notions such as fads behaving as “cascades” (Bikhchandani, S., Hirschleifer, D. and Welch, I., 1992) turn on the logic that trend setters (or “early adopters” in the subject specific language) might be enlisted to help establish a trend that, through various corporate strategies, could be sustained and manipulated by product placement strategies and celebrity endorsements (Reynolds, 1968).  For more mainstream economics trends are understood descriptively as a transitory deviation from the mean that might occur for a variety of reasons, sometimes observed in combination.  Faddishness in this sense is used to explain stock market bubbles and price volatility in secondary markets (such as antiques and curiosities) created by chain reactions of behavioural conformity – the mass behaviour required to create and burst stock market bubbles being a good example (also known as the bandwagon or stampede effects) (Camerer, 1989).  
With respect to local economic development the fashion for one type of policy over others displays a similar propensity to obey cycles.  Moreover as in other areas where fashion is an important consideration sometimes the next big thing genuinely is new in the sense of being previously untested, for example the Bloor West Business Improvement District in Toronto operating since 1971 sets the precedent against which all subsequent experiments with the concept are measured (Hoyt and Gopal-Agge, 2007), whilst on other occasions it is repetition of something from the past with a twist.  On this latter point, for example, the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders effected in large swathes of metropolitan England outside London ostensibly to correct the market failure of abandonment in low demand neighbourhoods since 2002 are of a piece with earlier moments of demolition and replacement from the past, particularly those of the 1950s and 1960s (and in some cases with similar effects – see Allen, 2007; see also, Yelling, 2000).  However, this second ‘experiment’– the desire for it to be thought of as such explicitly signalled by the pioneering implications of the nomenclature “pathfinder” – might be differentiated by context specific features such as the political vernacular in which it was couched (‘housing market renewal’ versus ‘slum clearance’) and the fact that it was delivered not through the planning system with the local authority as lead, as in most previous periods, but by the national regeneration agency, the Homes and Communities Agency, in concert with ‘preferred developers’ from the private house building industry.  
Perhaps the feeling that these urban interventions that have decades-long implications and wreak life-changing effects are in some sense experimental stems from the fact that they are often delivered by limited-life agencies that have no direct democratic underpinning.  This ephemeral nature makes it easy for an incoming government to sweep such agencies off the map, give a stay of execution or offer the local authority the option to subsume the agency and its headcount into their mainstream, democratically-legitimated suite of activities.   There is then often a period in which a fresh set of institutions are introduced and set the new fashion but with the echo of last season lingering in both the legacy agencies yet to be fully wound up and, sometimes, in the germ of the idea that underpinned their work (Cochrane, 1999).  The result is a landscape of interrupted interventions and disembodied agencies, the leftovers of last year’s big idea.  For example the creation of English Regional Development Agencies in 1999 has been understood as broadly consonant with the work of the Urban Development Corporations in the 1980s and 1990s (Ward and Deas, 1999); although the Conservatives’ scalar preoccupation with the problems of the ‘inner-city’ that informed the spatial scale for most of the UDCs was clearly qualitatively different to the strategic, regional remit of the RDAs. 
From this perspective the proclamations made by politicians that suggest a genuine break with the past and lasting alterations to the business model upon which urban regeneration policy proceeds should be treated with caution.  The election of 2010 and subsequent thinking of the UK Coalition government on urban planning serves as a good case study.  Amongst Eric Pickles’ first actions upon his appointment to the position of Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was to give local authority planning – the most consistent player in the long term struggle to effect urban regeneration - a makeover.  All references to “spatial planning” and “regions” were expunged from official documentation as these concepts were regarded as being symbolically linked with Labour policy on planning.  In their wake the ‘local’ came to be reified as the scale at which planning should take place.  The backdrop to this outlook is bound up with the idea of a ‘big society’, understood within the Conservative Party as redolent of long-standing Tory values of civic duty, and voluntarism.  Sold as the reawakening of the Conservative party to their inheritance bequeathed philosophically by Burke (1790) and politically through Disraeliesque One Nation ideals but forgotten in the modern period by the free market obsessions of the 1980s, such “Red Tories” (see principally Blond, 2010) have argued that this brand of bottom-up communitarian conservatism represents a genuine break with the hectoring argument that ‘there is no alternative’ to laissez-faire acquiescence.  
The territorial counterpart to this stripe of Conservatism is ‘the local’ often discussed in explicit opposition to other, now less fashionable, spatial scales particularly the region:
Communities will no longer have to endure the previous government's failed Soviet tractor style top-down planning targets...I promised to get rid of them and today I'm revoking regional plans with immediate effect - hammering another nail in the coffin of unwanted and an unaccountable regional bureaucracy. They were a national disaster that robbed local people of their democratic voice, alienating them and entrenching opposition against new development.
I want to make something very clear. Localism means much more than a tug of war of political power between Whitehall and the Town Halls. It's a fundamental shake up of the balance of power in this country.  So power goes right back to the people who elected us (Pickles, 2010).
Whether localism really will constitute a “fundamental shake up” will only be learnt in time.  However early signs suggest that, like other moments in the fashion history of urban regeneration, the fad will pass as its internal contradictions are exposed and political pragmatism takes over.  Indicators to this effect include the fact that accommodations made to the National Planning Policy Framework, the guidance that sets the tone for planning policies’ animation in practice, were won in no small part because of the lobbying of the right wing press (for example, the Daily Telegraph, 2011a, 2011b) – presumably still thoroughly opposed to new development in the wealthy home counties where their readership and the Conservative Party’s core vote happen to reside, irrespective of the scale at which the system is enacted.  Also, Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) designed to succeed the Regional Development Agencies are actually not ‘local’ in the same sense as the rest of the localism agenda at all but rather in most cases operate at a city-regional scale largely as a result of the advice of Tory grandee, Michael Heseltine (2012).   
What remains is the impression that we seem to be endlessly intrigued by the possibilities of ‘experimenting’ with a new para-state architecture that will in all likelihood be just another passing fad.  The end state is a whirl of short-lived interventions implemented by a hotchpotch of institutions, some the outmoded remnants of a previous set of experiments, some the latest bespoke addition.  To begin to explain this cycle of experimentation and re-experimentation it is helpful to return to one of the central questions in work that has sought to understand the lifecycle of fads in other walks of life: are tends determined by some semi-mystical set of forces, popularly wrapped up in the idea of a zeitgeist, that is then ‘discovered’ by a handful of early adopters before being disseminated more widely or is the zeitgeist deliberately formed and manipulated by an élite set of opinion-formers?  The self-same questions occupied Toby Young (2002: 215) in the popular book, and subsequent film, How to Lose Friends and Alienate People about his time working for the publisher of Vogue, Condé Nast, in Manhattan.  Invoking thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and V. S. Pritchett, the author parallels his colleagues’ fashion (false) consciousness with religious mysticism:
In their eyes, the ‘it’ in the expression ‘where it’s at’ refers to a mysterious, intangible entity that has many of the same properties as a divine being.  It’s invisible and yet it’s everywhere; it’s in the world and yet it’s not quite of it.  Above all, it seems to dictate that they behave in one way and not another.  In short it’s a distant echo of God’s will.  Doing the bidding of the Zeitgeist confers status on them in the same way that being a member of the Elect confers status within some sects; to be in fashion is to be in a state of Grace  
Ultimately Young, like parallel more academic treatments (Agins, 1999; Sproles, 1981), came to be a non-believer, coming down on the side of the argument that fashion’s will was not a mystical force but was rather determined by a more tawdry commercial relationship - analogous to “the game played further south in Manhattan, the one known as ‘Wall Street bilks Main Street’” (Young, 2002: 214) - between a relatively small number of influential individuals.  The only caveat to this view was that some were participating in the self-delusion that setting the next trend was not a deliberate act of commission on their part but rather proof of their more acute than normal communion with the changing spirit of the age. 
This idea that trends are purposefully determined, whether knowingly or subliminally, clearly resonates with any common sense interpretation of how fashions in, say, popular music or clothing come to predominate.  But it does not explain why a fashion might repeat.  Again, this issue mirrors the wider debate regarding whether the zeitgeist genuinely is an invisible hand or a commercial construct.  The former outlook would attribute mass market demand for a past fashion to be revisited to a collectively-shared will for a memory to be repeated; the latter implies that a conglomerate of business interests – manufacturers of products, endorsed celebrities, the media - conspire to create trends: although possibly in some quarters under a form of false consciousness that conflates being a trend setter as a response, rather than a spur, to the trend.   An impulse to re-visit a past trend is therefore understood as capricious fancy allied to important circumstantial factors such as global commodities’ prices and currency fluctuations.
For those who believe in this interpretation that fashions are determined by the whim of opinion formers, the question of how trends come and go in urban policy begs the question to what extent this is also an élite pastime?  If so we would need to ask who are the equivalents to the élite marketers that create and propagate fads in fashion with respect to urban regeneration policy – Peck’s (1995) “movers and shakers”.  Furthermore, to what extent are the trends that emerge indicative of a commercial pulse within the urban regeneration industry in the same way that setting this season’s ‘new black’ is determined by the fashion industry? To begin to explore these questions it makes sense to look at a particular urban experiment explicitly designed to formalise élite relationships across public and private sectors in urban regeneration: Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs).
The last next big thing: URCs as emblem and artefact
The desire to deliver urban development policy through effective partnership working between public and private sectors has been a consistent objective shared by governments since (at least) the urban programme and community development projects of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Higgins et al., 1983).  However, the idea that local urban development policy should be made, rather than simply delivered, by partnerships of this form dates primarily to the Urban Development Corporations introduced by the Planning and Land Act (1980). These nominally private sector-led agencies in places such as Merseyside, Trafford Park near Manchester and, most famously, London’s Docklands, were charged with catalysing development through a programme of land assembly and remediation to encourage private sector investment in areas characterised by capital flight.  The first wave in London’s Docklands and Merseyside dating from 1981 were followed in 1987 by five more (The Black Country, Cardiff Bay, Teeside, Trafford Park and Tyne and Wear), a third wave in 1988-9 (Bristol, Sheffield, Central Manchester and Leeds), and finally Birmingham Heartlands and Plymouth in 1992-3.
The story of the Urban Development Corporations has been told at length (Deas, Robson and Bradford, 2000; Lawless, 1989; Imrie and Thomas, 1999).  Controversies include their preoccupation with physical regeneration over social inclusion (Brownill, 1990; Brownill et al., 1996; Robinson and Shaw, 1991), although their remit from central government was always to focus on creating the conditions for development.  Furthermore their ambiguous position with respect to the planning system raised questions as the vesting of some development control powers with the UDCs potentially grated against the necessity for their actions to be congruent with the local authority’s statutory plan.  However, most fundamentally, it was the UDC’s democratic legitimacy that caused most concern.  As agencies with appointed boards UDCs lack of a democratic mandate, coupled with their institutional separation from the traditional animator of urban policy, the local authority, exercised many academics (Batley, 1989; Lawlesss, 1991; Stoker, 1991; Thornley, 1991).  In practice evidence would suggest that UDCs worked closely with local authorities and may even have been instrumental in encouraging a more collaborative form of urban politics and decision-making (Raco, 2005).  
Whatever their effects, post-industrial decline hastened by the vengeful macroeconomic restructuring of the later 1980s coupled with provincial augers of the national recession to come, contributed to the impression that, by 1989, the UDC experiment was in jeopardy.  Although all 13 UDCs limped on through first, the property market crash of 1989 and second, the general economic recession of the early 1990s, they began to be wound up beginning with Leeds in 1995, followed by the majority of the remainder in 1997-8 with only Cardiff Bay lasting until 2000.   Long before this formal end of the experiment focus had shifted to competitively allocated funding of a more project-based nature through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) (Rhodes, Tyler and Brennan, 2003) and on measures to encourage labour market adaptation such as Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) (Peck and Jones, 1995).   However, in the academic wash up it was speculated that the impacts of the UDCs would be far reaching, largely because of their effect of bringing business into urban policy making.  It was from this perspective that Harding et al., (2000: 990) speculated that “the formal involvement of the private sector within urban (and other sub-national) institutions and policy processes has become sufficiently well established to survive a change in the party control of the UK national government with relative ease".  
Around the same time as this conjecture an opportunity came for empirical testing in the shape of the Urban Task Force’s (1999: paragraph 4.24) rediscovery of an urgent need to “redevelop and bring investment back to the worst areas in our cities and towns”.  The response of the first Blair government was immediate with the institution of three pilot Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs) in Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool in the same year.  All three covered a different geography – Liverpool concentrated on the city centre, Manchester on the deprived east part of the city – but each was focussed on a small area, typically a city centre or a handful of wards.   A subsequent government-commissioned review (Amion Consulting, 2001) of the initial work of the pilot URCs gave clear backing to the idea that focussed, property-led activity through a concerted public-private vehicle was a necessary addition to the institutional apparatus on the logic that responsibility for the depressed condition of many urban centres was the shared public/private result of: “market failures in many areas of our towns and cities and of the inability of past public sector interventions to correct these failures and create lasting improvements” (Amion, 2001:6).  Said to underpin this failure to effect sustained urban regeneration was a lack of coordination between public and private activities: “not only had the market mechanism failed…but importantly, that past public sector interventions had not been able to correct these problems” (Amion, 2001:21).  In other words, URCs were explicitly aimed at areas where “local authorities had been unable to engage fully with the private sector as a result of past mistrust and poor relations” (Amion, 2001:22).  This breakdown of trust was said to require formal partnership between a business-led board and representation from the three principal public funders of area-based regeneration initiatives covering all three tiers of formal governance: the national regeneration agency; English Partnerships; the relevant Regional Development Agency and the Local authority (ODPM, 2004).  As a result of their composition and the fact that they were to be business-led it was maintained that these organisations would be at “arm’s-length” from local government and so would not have the taint of explicitly being a state agency. 
 This logic had startling parallels to the earlier rationale for UDCs: an independent agency tied to a specific geography (a UDA – Urban Development Area under the old UDCs) where a concerted focus was said to be required to stimulate private sector investment.  Further echoes can be found in the logic that the agency must be business-led and focus on bringing the private sector back into an area that it had previously shunned and that it should have an appointed board that seeks to consolidate land holdings.  The formal partnership of the three principal statutory landholders - the local authority, the regional development agency and the national regeneration agency, English Partnerships – within the URC represents a systemic difference between these agencies and the formally separate UDCs.  However, this must be balanced against the corresponding implication that this meant the agency with statutory planning controls (for both development management and the authorship of local planning policy) occupied a formal, strategic position within this otherwise business-orientated, para-state agency.   By contrast the principle (if not the practice, CLES, 1990; Raco, 2005) of UDC’s full separation from the local authority arguably represented less potential for a conflict of interest.  
At the time of their launch the association between URCs and UDCs was not widely acknowledged.  Despite significant parallels – in goals, scale and structure – a collective amnesia seemed to prevail that instead allowed URCs to be endorsed as a genuine departure from previous attempts to effect physical regeneration in specific small areas and, therefore, a model that might be rolled-out. Perhaps the best articulation of this identification of URCs as a new and, of course, ‘experimental’ trend that might catch on was offered by the official academic reviewers of the three pilot URCs: “the initial phase of this new experiment appears to hold out considerable promise for the URC ‘model’ as a vehicle for strategic planning and for the delivery of large regeneration programmes” (Parkinson and Robson, 2000:15).  Government approval was unequivocal: “URCs are regarded as effective organisations for delivering focused physical development that is important for the successful regeneration of areas in need…there should be no arbitrary limit placed on the number of URCs supported by the national programme” (ODPM, 2004: 8).  Perhaps unsurprisingly given the endorsement of the cognoscenti, the trend caught on and by 2005, URCs were de rigeur with 22 established across England and Wales.  Many faithfully followed the fashion’s originators in Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool such as Hull (Hull Citybuild) and Sunderland (Sunderland Arc) that clearly fit the stereotype of cities struggling with the long-term effects of de-industrialisation.  Others adopted the general trend but with bespoke adaptations such as the URC for the not obviously deprived (Gloucester Heritage) and the URC for the not even clearly urban (Cornwall’s CPR Regeneration covering Camborne, Poole and Redruth).

Subsequent evaluations of the first URCs, on the basis that they were the most long-standing and therefore the contexts where cause and effect could be most clearly established, followed (Liverpool Vision - SQW, 2005; New East Manchester - EIUA, 2005; Sheffield One - EIUA, 2007).  However by the time of this latter review in 2007 the macroeconomic circumstances had begun to change significantly with the first moments of the global financial crisis and the beginning of the deepest recession since the Great Depression.  Again, as with UDCs, the work that the URCs had overseen was choked off and a gradual impression emerged that the fashion had begun to pass.  Those wise to the shift in circumstances tried to change vestments.  Sheffield One was re-christened Creative Sheffield, a new city-regional ‘City Development Company’ (CDC) in 2008 mirroring similar moves in cities the length and breadth of Britain from Aberdeen (Aberdeen City Council, 2006) to Southampton (Southampton City Council, 2007).  Government liked what they saw:

Sheffield City Council has built on the track records of existing bodies, including the urban regeneration company (URC), Sheffield One, to establish a new city development company, Creative Sheffield, to spearhead the economic transformation of the city. Other places have developed, or are developing, new holistic economic development vehicles, combining functions such as housing strategy with a wider economic role. The Government believes there is considerable potential in this approach. Economic development companies operating at the city or city-regional level are a well established concept in countries including the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and Germany (CLG, 2007: 7).

However, the CDC experiment was short-lived, running for around 2 years with trailblazers like Sheffield and a matter of only months amongst those late to the party.  As always one or two – such as Liverpool Vision (still in existence at the time of writing) - even carried on in the old style but with their organisation gradually disembowelled as two of 2000’s ‘key players’, once thought essential to the URC formula, were disbanded.  First English Partnerships, itself a hybrid of agencies the family trees for which stretched back to the 1960s, was wound up and its remit passed to the Homes and Communities Agency in 2008.  Second, the Regional Development Agencies were abolished in the wake of June 2010’s emergency budget.  Nevertheless the content of the quote above is important as it helpfully identifies some of the important actors in determining the twists and turns of fashion in urban policy: the trend-setters in both central and local government and their position in a network of international experience that makes certain fashions cross some, but not other, national boundaries – a now burgeoning research area in itself (McCann and Ward, 2011).  
However, just like Young’s (2002) understanding of the fashion industry more generally the opinion formers could only work within the context of what the international and macro economy would permit.  CDCs were a more short-lived enthusiasm than either URCs or UDCs not because there was something qualitatively wrong with the idea of anchoring an economic development agency to a metropolitan geography – in government and academic approval it had the backing of two thirds of the triangle of opinion formers necessary for the fashion to take hold. But without the business end of the bargain there was insufficient commercial activity to justify the existence of a CDC to oversee or apparently stimulate.  The vicissitudes of the recession and particularly the seizure experienced in markets for credit, the lifeblood of the highly geared property sector, meant that CDCs - probably under some other name and with marginally altered format or remit - would have to wait for a more propitious moment to come back into style.

Conclusions: (Fast) fashions in policy recycling
Perhaps the most important implication of the above analysis is that the urban regeneration industry is recession-prone.  Fashions for one stripe of policy over another closely follow macroeconomic trends.  The brief history presented here understands URCs, for the most part broadly operational between 1999-2011, as consonant with the earlier UDCs, the majority of which existed between 1987-1998.  Importantly, both were strongly pro-cyclical with broader trends in the macro-economy.  
This observation provides one insight into why there might be continuity between two experiments of very similar duration twenty years apart: but it neither explains what forces combined to animate a desire to revisit the earlier experiment, nor why it was necessary to sublimate the parallels between the old and the new by reinforcing the idea that URCs were in some sense ‘experimental’ when they palpably were not. On the former point of identifying the opinion formers the audit trail points to a nexus of central and local government, private planning consultancies and influential academics (Amion, 2001; CLG, 2006, 2007; Parkinson, 2007; SQW, 2005) – the equivalents of the opinion formers in the glossy magazines that set trends in mainstream fashion.  However, the final quotation in the last section (CLG, 2007) would suggest the influence of similar networks outside the UK with which domestic policy makers may have had a connection: Urban Regeneration Companies, using precisely the same title, also operated in the Netherlands over a similar period as in the UK (Kort and Klijn, 2011) although it is difficult to establish if the direction of influence was from the Netherlands to Britain or vice versa,  
Investigations of this issue - what makes policy prescriptions ‘travel’ across international borders and contribute to the idea that the policy has ‘legs’ - are now well established (Theodore and Peck, 2011).  This import/export model of urban policy transactions must then also be contextualised amongst existing work that sees this and the impulse to revisit previous experiments as ‘policy recycling’ (Jones and Ward, 2002) as being indicative of a growing fatigue in neoliberal administrations to imagine new policy responses as mechanisms of crisis management.  The result is the “circularity of policy responses,” (Wilks-Heeg, 1996:1263) and leads to an explanation of the history of urban policy interventions as a cycle of repeated re-experimentation - sometimes of previous policy experiments as in the case of UDCs/URCs, sometimes of imports ‘attuned’ to domestic circumstance – but in all cases governed by whatever the wider economic climate will permit. From this perspective the impulse to badge each new wave of interventions as innovative is analogous to the sham of fashion.  Genuine innovation is as rare in urban policy as it is in the high street stores; however, the necessity to keep up the pretence is indicative of the same thing: the trend setter is running out of ideas.  So it is that Pickles’ “fundamental shake up” of 2011 echoes the “revolution in urban policy” (DoE, 1991) twenty years earlier.  The intervening moment that briefly bequeathed URCs has been served a similar critique by Jones and Ward (2002):
Take for instance the…urban White Paper, Our Town and Cities: The Future (DETR, 2000), in which the British state embraces, “third way” politics as the friendly face of neo-liberalism, but in the process exacerbates the contradictions of capitalism through its own interventions.  This revolutionary framework calls for a “new vision for urban living” largely founded on modernist assumptions on the need to get the “design and quality of the urban fabric right” (Urban Task Force, 1999: Chapter 2).  This is not revolutionary at all; its policy gene is a document (with a similar title) published twenty years ago (DoE, 1980) and key elements of the “urban renaissance” are heavily reminiscent of the last urban White Paper, Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977).
The continuity is the considerable one of the logic of neoliberalism. Fashions in urban policy are determined by Wacquant’s (1999:323) “parties, politicians, pundits and professors who yesterday mobilized with readily observable success, in support of ‘less government’ as concerns the prerogatives of capital and the utilization of labour, are now demanding, with every bit as much fervour, ‘more government’ to mask and contain the deleterious social consequences, in the lower regions of social spaces, of the deregulation of wage labor and the deterioration of social protection”.  The same net result, albeit from a different perspective, is offered by Cheshire (2006: 1234):
Both governments and the academic community have been complicit in this abnegation of responsibility. The basic research has not been done and the government has not funded it; the academic community has let its belief systems and egos run away with themselves so that we have become barkers for flawed policies rather than dispassionate investigators, analysts and collectors of evidence . . . we need a much more detailed understanding of how cities work before we impose policies.

The real world effects of this flighty repetition of nuanced urban experiments are more than just the alphabet soup that marks UDCs mutation into URCs, CDCs and then LEPs (Local Economic Partnerships).  The lasting impacts are disrupted interventions and un-sustained investment in urban areas resulting from “fast policy” (Peck, 2002) – more colloquially known as policy made ‘on the hoof’ – that obeys the whimsy of dépêche mode, “fast fashion”.   Given the apparently fickle nature of fashion it would seem foolish to prophesy the turn it will next take.  However there is enough evidence here to suggest that should a property boom come again it will be accompanied by an experimental public-private agency with a name easily collapsed into a three letter acronym and deployed at a sub-city geography.  And it will last approximately eleven years.

References
Aberdeen City Council (2006) Delivering City-wide Regeneration: Overview and Next Steps. Aberdeen: Aberdeen City Council.

Agins, T. (1999) The end of fashion. How marketing changed the clothing business forever. Harper Collins: New York.

Allen, C. (2007) Housing market renewal and social class.  Routledge: Oxford.

Amion Consulting (2001) Urban Regeneration Companies: Learning the Lessons. Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions: London.

Batley, R. (1999) London Docklands: an analysis of power relations between UDCs and local government.  Public Administration, 67 (2), 167-187.

Bikhchandani, S., Hirschleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992) The theory of fads, fashion, custom and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100 (51), 992-1026.

Blond, P. (2010) Red Tory: how left and right have broken Britain and how we can fix it. Faber and Faber: London.

Brownill, S. (1990) Developing London’s Docklands: Another great planning disaster? Paul Chapman: London.

Brownill, S., Razzaque, K., Stirling, T. and Thomas, H. (1996) Local governance and the racialisation of urban policy in the UK: the case of the UDCs.  Urban Studies, 33 (8), 1337-1356.

Burke, E. (1790) Reflections on the revolution in France. Oxford Paperbacks: Oxford. 

Camerer, C. (1989) Bubbles and fads in asset prices. Journal of Economic Surveys, 3 (1), 3-41.

Cheshire, P. (2006) Resurgent cities, urban myths and policy hubris: what we need to know, Urban Studies, 43(8), pp. 1231–1246.

CLES (Centre for Local Economic Strategies) (1990) Inner City regeneration.  A local authority perspective.  CLES: Manchester.

CLG (Communities and Local Government) (2006) The Role of City Development Companies in English Cities and City Regions: A Consultation. London: CLG.

CLG (Communities and Local Government) (2007) The Role of City Development Companies in English Cities and City Regions. London: CLG.

Cochrane, A. (1999) Just another failed urban experiment?  The legacy of the Urban Development Corporations, in R. Imrie and J. Thomas (Eds.) British Urban Policy, 2nd Edition, pp. 246-258. Sage: London.

Crane, D. and Bovone, L. (2006) Approaches to material culture: the sociology of fashion and clothing. Poetics, 34, 319-333

Davis. F. (1992) Fashion, culture and identity.  University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Deas, I. and Ward, K. (1999) The song has ended but the melody lingers: regional development agencies and the lessons of the urban development experiment. Local Economy, 14(2), pp. 114–132.

Deas, I. (2012) Towards post-political consensus in urban policy? Localism and the emerging agenda for regeneration under the Cameron government. Planning Practice and Research, 28 (1), 65-82.

Deas, I., Robson, B. and Bradford. M. (2000) Rethinking the urban development corporation ‘experiment’: the case of Central Manchester, Leeds and Bristol. Progress in Planning, 54, 1-72.

DoE (Department of the Environment) (1977) Policy for the inner cities. HMSO: London.

EIUA (European Institute for Urban Affairs) (2005) New Evaluated Manchester. EIUA, Liverpool John Moores University.

EIUA (European Institute for Urban Affairs) (2007) Sheffield One Evaluation: Final Report. EIUA, Liverpool John Moores University.

England, K. and Ward, K. (Eds.) (2007) Neoliberalization: states, networks, peoples.  Blackwell: London.

Entwistle, J. (2000) The fashioned body: fashion, dress and modern social theory. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Entwistle, J. (2009) The aesthetic economy of fashion.  Markets and values in clothing and modelling.  Berg: New York. 

Geddes, P. (1915) Cities in evolution. Williams and Norgate: London.

Harding, A. (1999) North American urban political economy, urban theory and British research.  British Journal of Political Science, 29, 673-698.

Harding, A., Wilks-Heeg, S. and Hutchins, M. (2000) Business, Government and the Business of Urban Governance. Urban Studies, 37 (5-6), 975-994.

Heseltine, M. (2012) No stone left unturned in pursuit of growth.  BIS: London.

Higgins, J., Deakin, N., Edwards, J. and Wicks, M. (1983) Government and urban poverty. Blackwell: Oxford.

HM Tresasury (2001) Productivity in the UK: The Regional Dimension. London: HM Treasury.

Hoyt, L. and Gopal-Agge, A. (2007) The business improvement district model: a balanced review of contemporary debates.  Geography Compass, 1 (4), 946-958.

Imrie, R. (1992) Beyond the urban development corporations. Local Economy, 6(4), pp. 351–353.

Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (1999) How new is the new local governance? Lessons from the United Kingdom. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 24 (1), pp. 45–63.

Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (1999) British Urban Policy.  An evaluation of the Urban Development Corporations.  Sage: London.

Jones, M. and Ward, K. (2002) Excavating the logic of British urban policy: neoliberalism as the “crisis of crisis management.  Antipode, 34, 473–494.

Kort, M. and Klijn, E. H. (2011) Public-private partnerships in urban regeneration  projects: organizational form or managerial capacity.  Public Administration Review,71 (4), 618-625.

Lawless (1989) Britain’s inner cities.  Paul Chapman: London.

Lawless (1991) Urban policy in the Thatcher decade: English inner-city policy, 1979-1990.  Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 9, 15-30.

Leach, S. and Game, C. (1991) English metropolitan governance since abolition: an evaluation of the English metropolitan county councils. Public Administration, 69 (2), 141-170.

Lord, A. and Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2013, in press) Is planning under attack?  European Planning Studies.

McCann, E. and Ward, K. (Eds.) (2011) Mobile Urbanism.  Cities and policy making in the global age. University of Minnesota: Minneapolis. 

Meyersohn, R. and Katz, E. (1957) A natural history of fads.  American Journal of Sociology, 62 (6), 594-601.

ODPM (2004) Urban Regeneration Companies: Policy Stocktake.  ODPM: London.

Parkinson, M. (2007) The Birmingham City Centre Masterplan: The Visioning Study. European Institute for Urban Affairs, Liverpool John Moores University.

Peck, J. (1995) moving and shaking.  Business elites, state localism and urban privatism. Progress in Human Geography, 19 (1), 16-46.

Peck, J. and Jones, M. (1995) Training and enterprise councils: Schumpeterian workfare state, or what? Environment and Planning A, 27, 1361-1396.	

Peck, J.(2002) Political economies of scale: fast policy, inerscalar relations and neoliberal workfare.  Economic Geography, 78 (3), 331-360.

Pickles, E. (2010) Making the planning system work more efficiently and effectively (​https:​/​​/​www.gov.uk​/​government​/​policies​/​making-the-planning-system-work-more-efficiently-and-effectively​).  Press release, 6th July 2010.  Department for Communities and Local Government: London.  Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eric-pickles-puts-stop-to-flawed-regional-strategies-today (​https:​/​​/​www.gov.uk​/​government​/​news​/​eric-pickles-puts-stop-to-flawed-regional-strategies-today​) Accessed 27th June 2013.

Raco, M. (2005) A step change of a step back? The Thames Gateway and the rebirth of the Urban Development Corporations.  Local Economy, 20 (2), 141-153.

Reynolds, W. H. (1968) Cars and clothing: understanding fashion trends.  Journal of Marketing, 	32, 44-49.

Rhodes, J., Tyler, P. and Brennan, A. (2003) New developments in area-based initiatives in England: the experience of the single regeneration budget.  Urban Studies, 40 (8), 1399-1426.

Robinson, F. and Shaw, K. (1991) Urban regeneration and community development. Local Economy, 6 (1), 61-72.

Robson, B. and Parkinson, M. (2000) Urban Regeneration Companies: A Process Evaluation. Centre for Urban Policy Studies, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester.

Russell, H. (2010) Research into multi-area agreements.  Long term evaluation of LAAs and LSPs.  Department for Communities and Local Government: London. 

Sapir, E. (1931) Fashion, pp. 139-141 in, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences VI. Macmillan: New York.

Savage, J. (1997) Teenage: the creation of youth, 1875-1945. Pimlico: London.

Sherlock, K. L., Kirk, E. A. and Reeves, A. D. (2004) Just the usual suspects? Partnerships and environmental regulation. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 22, 651-666.

Simmel, G. (1904) Fashion. International Quarterly, October, 135. 
Sorokin, P. A. (1956) Fads and foibles in modern sociology.  Henry Regnery Company: Chicago.

Southampton City Council (2007) Report to PUSH Economic Development Panel. Southampton: SCC.

Sproles, G. B. (1981) Analyzing fashion life cycles – principles and perspectives.  Journal of Marketing, 45, 116-124.

SQW (2005) An Evaluation of Liverpool Vision Ltd. SQW: Stockport.

Stoker, G. (1991) The politics of local government.  Macmillan: London.

Stoker, G. (2004) New localism, progressive politics and democracy, in: A. Gamble and T.Wright (Eds), Restating the State, pp. 117–129. Blackwell: Oxford.

SURF (centre for Sustainable Urban Futures) (2004) Releasing the National Economic Potential of Provincial City-regions: The Rationale for and Implications of a ‘Northern Way’ Growth Strategy. Salford: Centre for Sustainable Urban and RegionalFutures.

The Daily Telegraph (2011a) Hands off our land.  1st September 2011.  Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/countryside/8735475/Hands-off-Britains-countryside.html (​http:​/​​/​www.telegraph.co.uk​/​earth​/​countryside​/​8735475​/​Hands-off-Britains-countryside.html​) Accessed 17th January 2012.

The Daily Telegraph (2011b) Planning minister’s in pact with developers over reforms.  11th September 2011.  Available at:  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/hands-off-our-land/8756477/Planning-ministers-in-pact-with-developers-over-reforms.html (​http:​/​​/​www.telegraph.co.uk​/​earth​/​hands-off-our-land​/​8756477​/​Planning-ministers-in-pact-with-developers-over-reforms.html​) Accessed 14th September 2011.

Theodore, N. and Peck, J. (2011) Framing neoliberal urbanism : translating ‘commonsense’  urban policy  across the OECD zone.  European Urban and Regional Studies, 19 (1), 20-41.

Thornley, A. (1991) Urban planning under Thatcherism.  The challenge of the market.  Taylor and Francis: London.

Urban Task Force (1999) Towards an Urban Renaissance. E & FN Spon: London.

Ward, K. and Deas, I. (1999) The song has ended but the melody lingers.  Regional Development Agencies and the lessons of the Urban Development Corporation experiment. Local Economy, 14 (2), 114.132.

Wannop, U. and Cherry, G. E. (1994) The development of regional planning in the United Kingdom.  Planning Perspectives, 9, 29-60.

Wilks-Heeg, S. (1996) Urban experiments limited revisited: Urban policy comes full circle? Urban Studies, 33 (8), 1263-1279.

Yelling, J. (2000) The incidence of slum clearance in England and Wales, 1955-1985.  Urban History, 27 (2), 234-254.

Young, T. (2002) How to lose friends and alienate people. Abacus: London. 



1



